The differences in results may not reflect so much the distribution between the circles as the multiplicity between the different arbitration agreements.   Decisions taken entirely by an arbitration clause often concerned agreements without a salvatorial clause, see, for example. B Perez, 253 F.3d at 1286, or agreements which not only contained an unlawful provision which was easy to separable, but which were on the contrary omnipresent by illegality, see, for example.B. Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1248-49;  Hooters v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir.1999).   On the other hand, decisions that divide an illegal provision and a compulsory arbitration procedure generally considered agreements with a salvatorial clause and discrete provisions unenforceable, see, for example. B Morrison, 317 F.3d at 675;  Gannon, 262 F.3d to 680. We agree with the District Court that the separation of punitive damages and the application of the arbitration clause were appropriate.   The agreement not only contains a salvatorial clause, but Booker only identifies a discreet illegal provision in the agreement.   We rejected his argument that the agreement does not allow for adequate detection, and Booker himself acknowledges that “the separation of a provision may be based on sound jurisprudence” and that “the District Court`s decision to separate the determination of punitive damages may be sound.”   Applicant`s reply, 4, 14.   This unenforceable provision alone does not infect the arbitration clause as a whole.   The District Court did not unravel “a set of highly integrated illegal provisions,” Graham Oil, 43 F.3d to 1248, but removed a punitive damages prohibition that appears to have been stacked on an intact and functional framework, because the AAA Trade Rules — which were added by reference to the clause — already contain recourse provisions that do not prohibit punitive damages.   See trade rules 43 to 48.

  Indeed, by removing a corrective component of the arbitration clause, the District Court annulled a provision that is generally not considered essential for the consideration of a contract and therefore more easily separable.   See 15 Corbin on Contracts § 89.10, at 659 (rev. ed.2003);  Williston on Contracts § 19:69, at 543 (4th ed.1998) (referring to restatement (Second) of Contracts § § § 183 &cmt. a, 184).   See also Hadnot, 344 F.3d at 478 (argument that the blocking of punitive damages in the arbitration clause is an integral part of the overall employment contract and therefore cannot be dissociated). Paragraph Thirteen of the employment contracts limits by its provisions the exercise of the profession by the defendants after the termination of the employment relationship at RHI. . . .